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Abstract
We show that the mutual information, in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity, of any pair of
strings x and y is equal, up to logarithmic precision, to the length of the longest shared secret
key that two parties, one having x and the complexity profile of the pair and the other one
having y and the complexity profile of the pair, can establish via a probabilistic protocol with
interaction on a public channel. For ` > 2, the longest shared secret that can be established
from a tuple of strings (x1, ..., x`) by ` parties, each one having one component of the tuple and
the complexity profile of the tuple, is equal, up to logarithmic precision, to the complexity of
the tuple minus the minimum communication necessary for distributing the tuple to all parties.
We establish the communication complexity of secret key agreement protocols that produce a
secret key of maximal length, for protocols with public randomness. We also show that if the
communication complexity drops below the established threshold then only very short secret keys
can be obtained.
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1 Introduction
Mutual information is a concept of central importance in both information theory (IT) and
algorithmic information theory (AIT), also known as Kolmogorov complexity. We show
an interpretation of mutual information in AIT, which links it to a basic concept from
cryptography. Even though a similar interpretation was known in the IT framework, an
operational characterization of mutual information in AIT has been elusive till now.
To present our result, let us consider two strings x and y. It is common to draw a
Venn-like diagram such as the one in Figure 1 to visualize the information relations between
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them. As explained in the figure legend there are six important regions. The regions (1) to
C(x) C(y)
C(x | y) C(y | x)
C(x, y)
I(x : y)
Figure 1 Two strings x and y, and their information. There are six regions that we distinguish:
(1) The left solid circle represents the information in x, as given by its Kolmogorov complexity,
denoted C(x); (2) The right dotted circle represents the information in y, denoted C(y); (3) The
entire grey region (the two circles taken together) represents the information in x and y, denoted
C(x, y); (4) The light-grey region in the first circle represents the information in x conditioned by
y, denoted C(x | y); (5) The light-grey region in the second circle represents the information of
y conditioned by x, denoted C(y | x); and (6) the dark-grey region in the middle represents the
mutual information of x and y, denoted I(x : y).
(5) have a clear operational meaning. For instance, C(x) is the length of a shortest program
that prints x, C(x | y) is the length of a shortest program that prints x when y is given to it,
and so on. On the other hand, the mutual information I(x : y) from region (6) is defined by
a formula: I(x : y) = C(x) + C(y)− C(x, y). Intuitively, it is the information shared by x
and y. But is there an operational interpretation of the mutual information? As mentioned
above, we give a positive answer: The mutual information of x and y is essentially equal
to the length of a longest shared secret key that two parties, one having x and the other
one having y, and both parties also possessing the complexity profile of the two strings, can
establish via a probabilistic protocol.
The following simple example illustrates the above concepts. Suppose that Alice and
Bob want to agree on a common secret key. If they could meet face-to-face, they could just
generate such a key by, say, flipping a coin. Unfortunately, they cannot meet in person and
what makes the situation really troublesome is that they can only communicate through a
public channel. There is however a gleam of hope because Alice knows a random line x in
the affine plane over the finite field with 2n elements, and Bob knows a random point y on
this line. The line x is specified by the slope a and the intercept b and the point y by its two
coordinates c and d. Therefore each of x and y has 2n bits of information, but, because of
the geometrical correlation, together they have 3n bits of information. Thus, in principle,
Alice and Bob share n bits. Can they use them to obtain a common secret key? The answer
is yes: Alice sends a to Bob, Bob, knowing that his point is on the line, finds x, and now
they can use b as the secret key, because the adversary has only seen a, and a and b are
independent.
It may appear that the geometrical relation between x and y is crucial for the above
solution. In fact it is just a red herring and Alice and Bob can agree on a common secret
key in a very general setting. To describe it, we consider the scenario in which Alice has
a random string x and Bob has a random string y. If x = y, then Alice and Bob can use
their common string as a secret key in an encryption scheme (such as the one-time pad)
and achieve perfect information-theoretical security. What happens if x and y are not equal,
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but only correlated? Somewhat surprisingly, for many interpretations of “correlated,” they
can still agree on a shared secret key via interaction on a public channel (for instances of
this assertion, see [15, 3, 17, 1]). In this paper, we look at this phenomenon using the very
general framework of algorithmic information theory to measure the correlation of strings.
1.1 Our contributions
Characterization of mutual information. In a secret key agreement protocol, Alice and
Bob, on input x and respectively y, exchange messages and compute a common string that
is random conditioned by the transcript of the protocol. Such a string is said to be a shared
secret key. Unless specified otherwise, we use protocols having the following features:
(1) We assume that Alice and Bob also know how their x and y are correlated. In our
setting this means that Alice and Bob know the complexity profile of x and y, which, by
definition, is the tuple (C(x), C(y), C(x, y)).
(2) The protocols are effective and randomized, meaning that Alice and Bob use probabilistic
algorithms to compute their messages.
I Theorem 1 (Main Result, informal statement).
1. There is a secret key agreement protocol that, for every n-bit strings x and y, allows Alice
and Bob to compute with high probability a shared secret key of length equal to the mutual
information of x and y (up to an O(logn) additive term).
2. No protocol can produce a longer shared secret key (up to an O(logn) additive term).
Secret key agreement for three or more parties. Mutual information is only defined for
two strings, but secret key agreement can be explored for the case of more strings. Let us
consider again an example. Suppose that each of Alice, Bob, and Charles have a point in
the affine plane over the finite field with 2n elements, and that the three points, which we
call A,B,C, are collinear. Thus each party has 2n bits of information, but together they
have 5n bits of information, because given two points, the third one can be described with n
bits. The parties want to establish a common secret key, but they can only communicate
by broadcasting messages over a public channel. They can proceed as follows. Alice will
broadcast a string pA, Bob a string pB , and Charles a string pC , such that each party using
his/her point and the received information will reconstruct the three collinear points A,B,C.
A protocol that achieves this is called an omniscience protocol because it spreads to everyone
the information possessed at the beginning individually by each party. In the next step,
each party will compress the 5n bits, comprising the three points, to a string that is random
given pA, pB , pC . The compressed string is the common secret key. We will see that up to
logarithmic precision it has length 5n− (|pA|+ |pB |+ |pC |). Assuming we know how to do
the omniscience protocol and the compression step, this protocol produces a common secret
key of length 5n− CO(A,B,C), where CO(A,B,C) is the minimum communication for the
omniscience task for the points A,B,C. In our example, it is clear that each one of pA, pB , pC
must be at least n bits long, and that any two of these strings must contain together at least
3n bits. Using some recent results from the reference [28], it can be shown that any numbers
satisfying these constraints can be used for the omniscience task. It follows that the smallest
communication for omniscience is achieved when |pA| = |pB | = |pC | = 1.5n, and thus the key
has 5n− 4.5n = 0.5n bits (Warning: we have ignored in the entire discussion some O(logn)
terms). We show that this holds in general. If ` parties have, respectively, one component
of a tuple (x1, . . . , x`) of n-bit strings, then up to O(logn) precision, they can produce a
common secret key of length C(x1, . . . , x`) − CO(x1, . . . , x`), where CO(x1, . . . , x`) is the
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minimum communication for the omniscience task. The protocol that produces such a key
is probabilistic, and, as was the case for two strings, assumes that each party i has at the
beginning of the protocol besides its input string xi also the complexity profile of the entire
tuple (x1, . . . , x`). We also show a matching (up to O(logn)) upper bound: no probabilistic
protocol can produce a longer secret key.
I Remark. The value CO(A,B,C) is understood as the communication complexity of
the omniscience problem. However, it can be computed as a function of the Kolmogorov
complexities of the involved strings, see Definition 4 below. This fact (the communication
complexity of the optimal omniscience protocol depends only on the complexity profile of
the inputs) is not trivial and requires a proof.
Communication complexity for secret key agreement. In the protocol in Theorem 1, Alice
and Bob exchange min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) +O(logn) bits and obtain with high probability a
shared secret key of length I(x : y)− O(logn). In this protocol we can assume that Alice
and Bob use either private random bits, or public random bits. We show that for the model
with public random bits, the communication complexity of the protocol is optimal, in the
sense that in any protocol with public random bits there are input strings x and y, on which
Alice and Bob have to exchange at least min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) bits. In fact our lower bound
is stronger: we show that, for any constants δ1, δ2 > 0, if Alice and Bob use a protocol with
communication complexity (1 − δ1) min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) for every input pair x, y, then
there are inputs for which the shared secret key that they obtain has length at most δ2I(x : y).
That is, if the communication complexity sinks below the threshold min(C(x | y), C(y | x)),
then the size of the common secret key drops to virtually zero. To determine the optimal
communication complexity for the model with private random bits remains an open problem.
1.2 Related previous work.
IT vs. AIT. Before reviewing existing related results in the IT and the AIT frameworks, it
is useful to understand the distinction between the two theories. In computer science the
attribute random is mainly used in two (fairly different) contexts: random processes and
random objects. In short, IT, which we also call Shannon’s framework, focuses on the former,
whereas AIT, which we also call Kolmogorov’s framework, focuses on the latter. On the
one hand, we may think of an uncertain physical process with unpredictable outcomes, and
employ the framework of the classic probability theory (distributions, random variables, etc.).
The notion of a random variable formalizes the idea of a process like coin tossing. In this
context we can measure the uncertainty of a random variable as a whole (by its Shannon’s
entropy, its min-entropy, etc.), but we can not ask whether one specific outcome is random
or not. On the other hand, people use tables of random numbers, which are available as
specific sequences of digits, written on a disc or printed on a paper. The usefulness of such
a table depends on its individual properties: frequencies of digits, presence or absence of
hidden regularities, compressibility, etc. The usual way to measure the uncertainty of an
individual string of digits is Kolmogorov complexity. In both contexts the formal measures of
randomness may or may not involve computational complexity (see, e.g., different versions of
pseudoentropy for distributions and the resource bounded variants of Kolmogorov complexity
for individual strings). These two formalizations of randomness are connected but not
interchangeable.
Both notions of randomness appear in cryptography. For example, in the one-time pad
scheme, two parties share a “random” key that remains “secret” for the attacker. It is
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common to use Shannon’s framework, and therefore the notions of randomness and secrecy
are defined in terms of random processes. In the ideal situation both parties should have
access to a common source of randomness, e.g., to the results of tossing an unbiased coin
(hidden from the adversary). By tossing this coin n times we get a random variable with
maximal possible entropy, and thus, in Shannon’s framework, the quality of randomness is
perfect. But if by chance we obtain a sequence of n zeros, then this specific one-time pad looks
pretty useless in any practical application. However, Shannon’s information theory provides
no vocabulary to complain about this apparently non-random individual key. Antunes et al.
[2] suggested to use Kolmogorov complexity to measure the “secrecy” of individual instances
of a one-time pad or a secret sharing schemes. We have in mind a similar motivation, and in
this work a “secret key” is an individual string that is random in the sense of Kolmogorov
complexity.
Related work. We start with a brief account of works on secret key agreement in the
IT setting. The secret key agreement is a relatively well-studied problem in information
theory, motivated, as the name suggests, by applications in information-theoretically secure
cryptography. Wyner [27] and Csiszár and Körner [7] have analyzed the possibility of obtaining
a shared secret key in the case when one party sends to the other party a single message
on a channel from which the eavesdropper can obtain partial information. Maurer [16, 17]
considered the case of protocols with several rounds of communication and showed that
interaction can be more powerful than one-way transmission. Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] and
Maurer [17] have established the tight relation between interactive secret key agreement and
mutual information for memoryless sources. In the memoryless model, the input data is given
by two random variables (X1, X2) obtained by n independent draws from a joint distribution,
where Alice observes X1 and Bob observes X2. Informally stated, the references [17, 1]
show that the longest shared secret key that Alice and Bob can establish via an interactive
protocol with an arbitrary number of rounds is equal to the mutual information of X1
and X2. Csiszár and Narayan [8] go beyond the scenario with two parties, and consider
the case of an `-memoryless source (X1, . . . , X`) and ` parties, each one observing one
component of the tuple. They show that the longest shared secret key the ` parties can
establish via an interactive protocol with an arbitrary number of rounds is equal to the
entropy H(X1, . . . , X`) of the `-memoryless source from which one subtracts the minimum
communication for omniscience. Their result holds also for stationary ergodic sources, which
generalize memoryless sources. As one can see, our results are very similar. They have been
inspired by the papers [1, 17, 8] and represent the AIT analogue of the results presented
above. Our results imply their IT analogues, and can be viewed as more general because
they do not require the memoryless or ergodicity properties of sources (in fact they do not
require any generative model at all). Regarding the communication complexity of secret
key agreement protocols, we only note here that Tiyagi [26] has shown that for memoryless
sources it is equal to the difference between interactive common information in Wyner’s
sense and mutual information. In the full version of this paper we explain how Tyagi’s result
compares to our results on communication complexity in the AIT framework.
Let us now say a few words about related results from the AIT world. To the best of our
knowledge, in AIT there has been no previous works on secret key agreement. However, the
general idea of “materialization” of mutual information was studied extensively. Motivated
by the intuition that mutual information represents the amount of shared information in two
strings, researchers have explored the extent to which mutual information can be materialized
more or less effectively. The relevant concept is that of common information. Informally, a
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string z is a common information string extracted from strings x and y, if z can be “computed”
from x, and also from y, where “computed” is taken in a more liberal sense that allows
the utilization of a few help bits. In the most common setting of parameters, we require
that C(z | x) = O(logn) and C(z | y) = O(logn), where n is the length of x and y and the
constant hidden in the O(·) notation depends only on the universal machine. Informally, the
common information of x and y is the length of a longest common information string that
can be extracted from x and y. It can be shown that up to logarithmic precision common
information is upper bounded by mutual information. In an influential paper, Gács and
Körner [9] have constructed strings x and y for which the common information is much smaller
than the mutual information. Moreover, the property of a pair (x, y) of having common
information equal to mutual information does not depend solely on the complexity profile
of x and y: There exist pairs (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) having the same complexity profile, and
for (x1, y1) the common information and mutual information are equal, whereas for (x2, y2)
they are not. Muchnik [19] and Romashchenko [22] have strengthened the Gács-Körner
theorem in significant ways, by allowing a larger amount of help bits, parameterizing the
mutual information of the constructed pair (x, y), and other ways. Chernov et al. [6] presents
alternative constructions of strings for which the common information is smaller than mutual
information for several regimes of parameters. A nice, self-contained and accessible exposition
of this research line can be found in the book of Shen, Vereshchagin and Uspensky [23,
Chapter 11].
Thus, previous works have shown negative results regarding the “materialization” of
mutual information in AIT. As far as we know, ours is the first positive result. In summary,
we now know that computation without communication, even enhanced with help bits, fails
to extract the mutual information of two strings, while interactive computation succeeds.
1.3 The basics of algorithmic information theory
Given a Turing machine M , a string p is said to be a program (or a description) of a string x,
if M on input p prints x. We denote the length of a binary string x by |x|. The Kolmogorov
complexity of x relative to the Turing machine M is
CM (x) = min{|p| | p is a program for x relative to M}.
If U is universal Turing machine, then for every other Turing machine M there exists a string
m such that U(m, p) = M(p) for all p, and therefore for every string x, CU (x) ≤ CM (x)+ |m|.
Thus, if we ignore the additive constant |m|, the Kolmogorov complexity of x relative to U
is minimal. We fix a universal Turing machine U , drop the subscript U in CU (·), and denote
the complexity of x by C(x). Similarly to the complexity of x, we define the complexity of x
conditioned by y as C(x | y) = min{|p| | U on input p and y prints x}. We list below a few
basic facts about Kolmogorov complexity and introduce some notation:
For every string x, C(x) ≤ |x|+O(1), because a string x is trivially described by itself.
(Formally, there is a Turing machine M that, for every x, on input x prints x.)
Using some standard computable pairing function 〈·, ·〉 that maps pairs of strings into
single strings, we define the complexity of a pair of strings by C(x, y) = C(〈x, y〉). Then
we can extend this notation to tuples of larger arity.
We use the convenient shorthand notation a ≤+ b to mean that a ≤ b+O(logn), where n
is a parameter that is clear from the context and the constant hidden in the O(·) notation
only depends on the universal machine U . Similarly, a ≥+ b means a ≥ b−O(logn), and
a =+ b means (a ≤+ b and a ≥+ b).
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The chain rule (a.k.a. the Kolmogorov–Levin theorem) claims that for all sufficiently
long strings x and y,
∣∣C(x, y)− (C(x) + C(y | x))∣∣ ≤ 3(logC(x) + logC(y)).
The mutual information of two strings x and y is denoted I(x : y), and is defined as
I(x : y) = C(x) + C(y)− C(x, y).
The complexity profile of a tuple of strings (x1, . . . , x`) is given by the tuple consisting
of the complexities of all non-empty subsets of the strings in the tuple, i.e., it is the
tuple (C(xV ) | V ⊆ [`], V 6= ∅). Here xV denotes the subtuple obtained by taking the
components with indices in V (for example if V = {1, 2, 7} then xV = (x1, x2, x7)).
1.4 Shared secret keys and protocols for secret key agreement
Let k be a positive integer. A k-rounds two-party protocol for secret key agreement uses two
computable functions A and B and runs as follows. The first party has as input a string xA
and uses private randomness rA, the second party has as input a string xB and uses private
randomness rB. We assume that the length of rA (rB) is determined by xA (respectively,
xB). The protocol consists of the following calculations:
x1 = A(xA, rA), y1 = B(xB , rB , x1)
x2 = A(xA, rA, y1), y2 = B(xB , rB , x1, x2)
...
xk = A(xA, rA, y1, . . . , yk−1), yk = B(xB , rB , x1, . . . , xk).
The algorithms A and B can handle inputs of different lengths. We also allow them to be
partial (i.e., it is possible that the protocol does not converge for some pairs of inputs). Let
us fix parameters ε and δ(n). (We assume ε is a positive constant and δ(n) is a constant or
a slow growing function, e.g., O(logn)). A protocol succeeds with error probability ε and
randomness deficiency δ(n) on a pair (xA, xB) of n-bit strings if with probability (1− ε) over
rA, rB ,
A(xA, rA, t) = B(xB , rB , t)
def.= z, (1)
and
C(z | t) ≥ |z| − δ(n), (2)
where t = (x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk) is the transcript of the protocol.
The string z satisfying equation (1) and inequality (2) is called a shared secret key output
by the protocol on input (xA, xB). Note that the shared secret key z is a random variable
since it depends not only on the inputs xA and xB , but also on the randomness rA and rB .
In words, Alice and Bob start with input strings xA and respectively xB, use private
randomness rA, and respectively rB and execute a protocol in which at round i, first Alice
sends to Bob the string xi, and next Bob sends to Alice the string yi, and at the end Alice and
Bob separately compute with high probability a common string z (equation (1)) such that
z is random even conditioned by the transcript of the protocol (inequality (2)). Thus, z is
secret to an adversary that has observed the protocol and consequently knows the transcript.
The number of rounds in a protocol (parameter k) may depend on the length of the
inputs.
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2 Main results
We present here our main results. We first show that there exists a secret key agreement
protocol which produces a shared secret key of length equal (up to logarithmic precision) to
the mutual information of the inputs, provided the two parties know the complexity profile.
Next we show that no protocol can produce a longer shared secret key. The formal statements
are as follows.
I Theorem 2 (Lower bound). There exists a secret key agreement protocol with the following
property: For every n-bit strings x and y, for every constant ε > 0, if Alice’s input xA
consists of x, the complexity profile of (x, y) and ε, and Bob’s input xB consists of y, the
complexity profile of (x, y) and ε, then, with probability 1− ε, the shared secret key is a string
z such that, C(z | t) ≥ |z| − O(log(1/ε)) and |z| ≥ I(x : y) − O(log(n/ε)), where t is the
transcript of the protocol. Moreover, the communication consists of a single message sent by
Alice to Bob of length C(x | y) +O(log(n/ε)), Alice uses O(log(n/ε)) random bits, and Bob
does not use any random bits.
I Theorem 3 (Upper bound). Let us consider a protocol for secret key agreement, let xA
and xB be input strings of length n on which the protocol succeeds with error probability ε
and randomness deficiency δ(n), and let z be the random string that is the shared secret key
output by the protocol, i.e., a string satisfying relations (1) and (2). Then with probability
at least 1−O(ε), if n is sufficiently large, |z| ≤ I(xA : xB) + δ(n) +O(log(n/ε)), where the
constants in the O(·) notation depend on the universal machine, but not on xA and xB.
Theorem 3 establishes the upper bound claimed in the Introduction. Indeed, for any
pair of n-bit strings (x, y), suppose that Alice’s input xA consists of x and the complexity
profile of (x, y) and Bob’s input xB consists of y and the complexity profile of (x, y). Note
that I(xA : xB) =+ I(x : y), because the length of the complexity profile is bounded by
O(logn). Hence, Theorem 3 implies that secret key agreement protocols in which the two
parties, besides x and respectively y, are additionally given the complexity profile of their
inputs can not produce a secret key that is longer than I(x : y) + O(logn) (provided the
randomness deficiency of the key satisfies δ(n) = O(logn)).
I Remark. In our secret key agreement protocols, the inputs xA and xB have two components:
xA = (x, hA) and xB = (y, hB), where the strings x and y are the main components, while
hA and hB are short helping strings (for example, containing information about how x and y
are correlated). The protocols designed in this paper succeed for all input pairs xA and xB in
which hA = hB = (the complexity profile of x and y). In case one or both of hA and hB are
not equal to the complexity profile, the protocols still halt on every input, but the outputs
may be meaningless. However, the proof of Theorem 2 can be adapted to the situation where
Alice and Bob are not given the exact value of the complexity profile of (x, y) but only an
approximation of this profile. If Alice and Bob are given upper and lower bounds for each
component of the complexity profile of (x, y) with precision ≤ σ, for some integer σ, then
with probability 1−O(ε) Alice and Bob agree on a common secret z that is incompressible
(i.e., C(z | t) ≥ |z| −O(log(1/ε)) where t is the transcript of the protocol), and the length of
z is greater than I(x : y)− σ −O(log(n/ε)).
3 Secret key agreement for three or more parties
In this section we analyze secret key agreement for 3 parties, which we call Alice, Bob, and
Charles. Alice has a string xA, Bob has a string xB, and Charles has a string xC . They
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also have private random bits rA, respectively rB and rC . They run a k-round protocol. In
each of the k rounds, each party broadcasts a message to the other two parties, where the
message is a string computed from the party’s input string and private random bits, and
the messages from the previous rounds. After the completion of the k rounds, each party
computes a string. The requirement is that with probability at least 1− ε, they compute the
same string, and that this string is random conditioned by the transcript of the protocol.
Formally, a k-round 3-party protocol for secret key agreement uses three computable
functions A,B,C, and runs as follows. The first party has as input an n-bit string xA and
uses private randomness rA, the second party has as input an n-bit string xB and uses
private randomness rB , and the third party has as input an n-bit string xC and uses private
randomness rC . The protocol consists of the following calculations:
t1 = A(xA, rA), t2 = B(xB , rB), t3 = C(xC , rC),
t4 = A(xA, rA, t[1 : 3]), t5 = B(xB , rB , t[1 : 3]), t6 = C(xC , rC , t[1 : 3]),
t7 = A(xA, rA, t[1 : 6]), t8 = B(xB , rB , t[1 : 6]), t9 = C(xC , rC , t[1 : 6]),
...
 k rounds
Each row corresponds to one round and shows the messages that are broadcast in that round,
and we use the notation t[i : j] to denote the tuple of messages (ti, . . . , tj). We also denote
t = t[1 : 3k], the entire transcript of the protocol. The protocol succeeds with probability
error ε and randomness deficiency δ(n) on the 3-tuple input (xA, xB , xC) if with probability
(1− ε) over rA, rB , rC ,
A(xA, rA, t) = B(xB , rB , t) = C(xC , rC , t)
def.= z, (3)
and C(z | t) ≥ |z| − δ(n).
I Definition 4.
(1) For each triple of strings (x1, x2, x3), we denote by S(x1, x2, x3) the set of all triples of
integers (n1, n2, n3) that satisfy the following inequalities:
n1 ≥ C(x1 | x2, x3), n2 ≥ C(x2 | x1, x3), n3 ≥ C(x3 | x1, x2),
n1 + n2 ≥ C(x1, x2 | x3), n1 + n3 ≥ C(x1, x3 | x2), n2 + n3 ≥ C(x2, x3 | x1).
The constraints defining S(x1, x2, x3) will be referred as the Slepian-Wolf constraints.
(2) We define CO(x1, x2, x3) to be the minimal value of n1 + n2 + n3 subject to n1, n2, n3
satisfying the Slepian-Wolf constraints. (CO stands for communication for omniscience.)
We show that there exists a protocol that on every input tuple (xA, xB , xC) produces with
high probability a secret key of length C(xA, xB , xC)−CO(xA, xB , xC)−O(logn) (provided
the parties have the complexity profile of the input tuple), and that no protocol can produce
a secret key of length larger than C(xA, xB , xC)− CO(xA, xB , xC) +O(logn).
I Theorem 5 (Upper bound). Let us consider a 3-party protocol for secret key agreement
with error probability ε, where the number of random bits is bounded polynomially in the input
length. Let (xA, xB , xC) be a 3-tuple of n-bit strings on which the protocol succeeds. Let z be
the random variable which represents the secret key computed from the input (xA, xB , xC)
and let t be the transcript of the protocol that produces z. Then, for sufficiently large n, with
probability 1−O(ε) we have C(z | t) ≤ C(xA, xB , xC)− CO(xA, xB , xC) +O(log(n/ε)).
I Theorem 6 (Lower bound). There exists a 3-party protocol for secret key agreement with
the following characteristics. For every n, for every tuple (x1, x2, x3) of n-bit strings, for
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every ε > 0, if Alice’s input xA consists of x1, the complexity profile of the tuple and ε,
Bob’s input xB consists x2, the complexity profile of the tuple and ε, and Charles’s input
xC consists of x3, the complexity profile of the tuple and ε, then at the end the three parties
compute with probability 1−O(ε) a common string z such that
C(z | t) ≥ |z| −O(log(1/ε)) and |z| ≥ C(x1, x2, x3)− CO(x1, x2, x3)−O(log(n/ε)),
where t is the transcript of the protocol.
I Remark. Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 remain valid for any constant number ` ≥ 3 of parties,
with a suitable generalization of the omniscience CO(x1, . . . , x`), see the full version of the
paper.
4 Communication complexity of secret key agreement
It is of interest to find the communication complexity for the task of finding a shared secret
key having the optimal length of I(x : y). We solve this problem in the model of randomized
protocols with public random bits, visible to Alice, Bob, and the adversary. This model is
obtained by modifying slightly the definition from Section 1.4 (in which the random bits are
private): we require that rA = rB = r and we change equation (2) to C(z | t, r) ≥ |z| − δ(n).
The protocol presented in the proof of Theorem 2 solves the task with communication
min(C(x | y), C(y | x)) + O(logn). This protocol can be easily modified to work in the
model with public randomness. We argue that within the model with public randomness
the communication complexity of this protocol is optimal, up to the O(logn) term. In what
follows we assume as usual that Alice is given a string x and Bob is given a string y, and
both parties know the complexity profile of (x, y).
I Theorem 7. Let ε, δ1, δ2 be arbitrary positive real constants. There is no secret key
agreement protocol with public random bits such that for all inputs x and y,
1. the communication complexity of the protocol (the total number of all bits sent by Alice
and Bob) is less than (1− δ1) min{C(x | y), C(y | x)},
2. Alice and Bob agree with probability > ε on a common key z such that C(z | t, r) > δ2I(x :
y), where r is the public randomness and t = t(x, y, r) is the transcript of the protocol.
5 Our techniques.
It is common for statements in IT (in the Shannon’s entropy framework) to have an analogue
version in AIT (in the Kolmogorov complexity framework). However, there is no canonical
way to translate a result from one setting to the other, and proofs of homologous results in
these two frameworks can be drastically different. A textbook example of this phenomenon
is the chain rule: it is valid for Shannon’s entropy and for Kolmogorov complexity, and the
formal expressions of this rule in both frameworks look very similar. However, in Shannon’s
case this fact is an easy corollary of the definition, while in Kolmogorov’s version it requires
a nontrivial argument (which is known as the Kolmogorov–Levin theorem). There are
more advanced examples of parallel properties (from IT and AIT respectively), where the
discrepancy between their proofs is even more striking.
This phenomenon manifests itself in this work as well. Our main results are motivated
by similar ones in IT, and there is a close resemblance of statements. As discussed above,
this is not surprising. In what follows we explain the relation between our proofs and the
proofs of similar statements in Shannon’s framework.
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The positive results (the existence of communication protocols) use constructions that at
the high level are akin to those from their IT counterparts [17, 1, 8]. We employ a similar
intuitive idea – manipulations with “fingerprints” of inputs of appropriate lengths2. However,
the technical machinery is different. In the AIT framework, for communication-efficient
protocols, we need quite explicit constructions, while homologous results in IT are usually
proven by choosing random encodings. Our constructions are based on a combination of
extractors and universal hashing. Our general protocols are not time-efficient and this is
to be expected given the high generality of the type of data correlation in the AIT setting.
However, for some particular types of correlation (e.g., for a pair of inputs with a bounded
Hamming distance), our protocols can be modified to run in polynomial-time. In this case
we use the reconciliation technique from [25, 10, 11].
In the negative results (upper bounds for the size of the common secret key, Theorems 2
and 5) the ideas from IT do not help. The reason is that in the AIT framework, the mutual
information of various strings is not exactly zero, but only close to zero within some slack
terms. The slack terms are small, but during the rounds of a protocol, the errors can
accumulate and grow beyond control (for more detail see the discussion of the limits of
the “weak” upper bound int he full version of the paper). To overcome this obstacle we
come up with a new type of inequalities for Kolmogorov complexity. These inequalities are
substantially different from the classic information inequalities used in the analogous results
in IT. This technique is based on ideas similar to the conditional information inequalities in
[13, 14]. We believe that this technique can be helpful in other cases, including applications
in IT (see the discussion in the full version of the paper).
In the proof of a lower bound for communication complexity (Theorem 7), we use methods
specific for AIT, with no apparent parallel in IT. We adapt the technique of bounds for the
size of common information that goes back to An. Muchnik and use deep results regarding
stochastic strings [24, 20, 21], which have not been previously employed in information theory
and communication complexity.
6 Final comments
On time-efficient secret key agreement protocols. The secret key agreement protocol in the
proof of Theorem 2 is computable but highly non-efficient. The only slow stage is when Bob
reconstructs x given his input string y and the fingerprint of x obtained from Alice. At this
stage Bob has to simulate all programs of size C(x | y) until he obtains a string matching
the fingerprint. All other stages of the protocol can be implemented in polynomial time (to
this end we need to use an effective version of an extractor in the definition of fingerprints;
this increases the overhead in communication complexity from O(logn) to poly(logn), but
this is still negligible compared to the size of the fingerprint, which is the dominating term
in the communication complexity of the protocol; for details see [28]).
We cannot make Bob’s computation effective in general, but we can do it for some specific
pairs of inputs (x, y). Actually we can make the entire communication protocol fast, if there
is a way to communicate x from Alice to Bob so that (i) communication complexity of this
stage (and therefore the information revealed to the adversary) remains about C(x | y), and
(ii) all computations are performed by Alice and Bob in time poly(n).
2 On the high level this protocol consists of three stages: (i) Alice sends to Bob a suitable “fingerprint” of
her input p1(x); (ii) Bob uses y and p1(x) to recover x; (iii) then both Alice and Bob independently
compute another fingerprint p2(x), which is used as a common secret key. The construction of the
fingerprints guarantees that the adversary (who eavesdrops p1) obtains virtually no information about p2.
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Example 1. (Discussed in Introduction, p. 2.) Let Alice get a random line x in the affine
plane over the finite field with 2n elements, and Bob get a random point y on this line. For
most inputs of this type we have C(x | y) = n±O(logn), and there exists a simple way to
transfer x from Alice to Bob with communication complexity n (Alice just sends to Bob the
slope of her affine line, and Bob draws a line with this slope incident to his point). Thus,
we see once again that for this simple example there exists an effective (polynomial-time)
communication protocol to agree on common secret key of size ≈ n bits.
Example 2. Let Alice and Bob get n-bits strings x and y respectively, and the Hamming
distance between these strings is at most δn for some constant δ < 1/2. For most inputs of
this type we have C(x | y) = h(δ)n±O(logn) and I(x : y) = (1− h(δ))n±O(logn), where
h(δ) = δ log 1δ + (1− δ) log
1
1−δ . Can we transfer x from Alice to Bob with communication
complexity h(δ)n+ o(n) ? It turns out that such a protocol exists; moreover, there exists
a communication protocol with asymptotically optimal communication complexity and
polynomial time computations, see [25, 10, 11]. Plugging this protocol in our proof of
Theorem 3 we conclude that on most pairs of inputs (x, y) of this type Alice and Bob can
agree on a common secret key of size (1− h(δ))n− o(n), with poly-time computations for
both parties.
On using our approach for “one-shot” sources. Most known results for secret key agreement
in Shannon’s framework are proven under the assumption that the input data available to
Alice and Bob is generated by i.i.d. or at least stationary ergodic sources. These results can
be derived from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, using the well-known relation between Shannon
entropy and Kolmogorov complexity for the above type of sources [18, 12]. But actually
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 apply in more general settings. We can prove similar bounds for
random inputs obtained in one shot, without the property of ergodicity.
This is useful because in many natural instances of the secret key agreement problem the
input data are far from being ergodic, and therefore the classic technique does not apply. For
instance, Example 1 and Example 2 discussed above illustrate this situation if we reformulate
them in the probabilistic setting (i.e., we introduce the uniform distribution on the set of
all valid pairs of inputs). For the probabilistic versions of these examples the matching
upper and lower bounds on the size of the common secret key can be easily deduced from
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
On the error probability. The standard results on secret key agreement deal with the
paradigm that the protocol works properly for most randomly chosen inputs (which is typical
for the information theory), while in our approach we prove a somewhat stronger statement:
for each valid pair of input data the protocol works properly with high probability (which is
typical for the theory of communication complexity).
7 Open problems and acknowledgements
I Open Question 1. In Theorem 7 we establish a lower bound on how many bits Alice
and Bob must communicate to agree on a common secret key. Our proof is valid only for
communication protocols with public randomness. Is the same bound true for protocols with
private sources of random bits?
I Open Question 2. Our communication protocols are randomized. On the other hand
they use unusually few random bits, only O(logn). It is natural to ask whether we can get
rid of external randomness. We conjecture that for (O(logn), O(logn))-stochastic tuples
of inputs the protocol can be made purely deterministic (though it would require very high
computational complexity), but this cannot be done in the general case. The proof of this
fact likely requires a better understanding of the nature of non-stochastic objects (such as
Chaitin’s Omega number, [4], see also [24] and [23]).
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